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Abstract
Impaired Theory of Mind (ToM) has been repeatedly reported as a feature of psychotic disorders. ToM is crucial in social
interactions and for the development of social behavior. It has been suggested that reasoning about the belief of others,
requires inhibition of the self-perspective. We investigated the neural correlates of self-inhibition in nineteen low psychosis
prone (PP) and eighteen high PP subjects presenting with subclinical features. High PP subjects have a more than tenfold
increased risk of developing a schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. Brain activation was measured with functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging during a ToM task differentiating between self-perspective inhibition and belief reasoning.
Furthermore, to test underlying inhibitory mechanisms, we included a stop-signal task. We predicted worse behavioral
performance for high compared to low PP subjects on both tasks. Moreover, based on previous neuroimaging results,
different activation patterns were expected in the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) in high versus low PP subjects in self-
perspective inhibition and simple response inhibition. Results showed increased activation in left IFG during self-perspective
inhibition, but not during simple response inhibition, for high PP subjects as compared to low PP subjects. High and low PP
subjects showed equal behavioral performance. The results suggest that at a neural level, high PP subjects need more
resources for inhibiting the self-perspective, but not for simple motor response inhibition, to equal the performance of low
PP subjects. This may reflect a compensatory mechanism, which may no longer be available for patients with schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders resulting in ToM impairments.
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Introduction
The capacity to understand other people’s mental states or
Theory of Mind (ToM) is crucial in social interactions and for the
development of social behavior. ToM is a broad concept referring
to the ability to understand other people’s mental state, the
understanding that another person may have a different belief, and
the understanding of the others’ subsequent behavior [1]. This
ToM ability relies upon a wide network of brain areas, most
importantly encompassing lateral frontal, medial frontal and
temporal areas (see [2] and [3] for a more detailed account of
the neurobiological underpinnings of ToM). A large body of
research has demonstrated that ToM is often impaired in patients
with schizophrenia [4]. Indeed, the overwhelming evidence of
ToM impairments in schizophrenia leads to the proposition that
impaired ToM may be a trait characteristic of the disorder [4].
Even though patients in the acute phase of the disorder are more
impaired than remitted patients, the latter group still demonstrates
significant impairments in ToM [5].
ToM problems have not only been observed in people with
schizophrenia, but also in subjects with an enhanced risk for
schizophrenia, e.g. first-degree relatives of patients [6,7] and
healthy subjects who are prone to psychosis (PP) [8–11]. PP, also
called schizotypy (though schizotypy refers to a personality trait
whereas PP merely implies a vulnerability for psychosis, the terms
are used interchangeably), refers to a broad range of sub-clinical
experiences and personality characteristics that are related to
psychosis in the general population [12,13]. High PP subjects are
thought to have biological and/or cognitive predispositions for the
development of psychosis later in life [14,15]. Consistent with this
hypothesis, longitudinal studies have demonstrated that approx-
imately 10% of the high PP subjects will develop a schizophrenia
spectrum disorder at a later point [16,17]. PP may precede an at
risk mental state (ARMS) in which clinical symptoms are present,
but no transition to psychosis has yet occurred. These individuals
show social functioning as well as cognitive deficits, but less severe
than patients with a psychotic disorder [18,19]. Barragan et al. [9]
suggested that impairments in ToM may have a developmental
nature and are associated with psychotic-like experiences. This
would imply that in high PP subjects, such difficulties can be
detected in a very early stage. The most important rationale to
study ToM in a sub-clinical group without psychosis, was that it
allows us to study an important cognitive process known to be
involved in psychosis, without confounding factors such as
medication, illness duration and institutionalization. Since some
studies did not find ToM problems in PP [7] or did find social
functioning problems in PP, but no ToM deficits [20,21], we need
other methods to investigate whether such difficulties can be
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detected in a very early stage. Understanding the underlying
neural mechanisms of impairments in ToM at an early stage will
provide insights in processes that may induce psychotic decom-
pensation (such as impaired ToM) and provide guidance towards
new treatments focussing on social difficulties in schizophrenia.
It has been suggested that observing behavior and emotions in
other people automatically activates the representation of such
behavior and/or emotions in oneself [22–24]. Applying this
automatic tendency to assume one’s own mental state as a correct
model for others when actually unjustified, has been proposed as
the underlying cause for impairments in ToM [25–27]. Improp-
erly applying this automatic tendency can result in misattributions
of mental state and may be induced by a failure to suppress one’s
own perspective [25]. Such misattributions have been demon-
strated in young children [1,28], adults suffering brain damage
[29–32] and psychiatric patients (e.g. autism and schizophrenia
[33–36]). Interestingly, such misattributions have been related to
limited inhibitory control [37]. A body of evidence demonstrated
that the development of executive functions (like inhibitory
control) and ToM [37] is related to the development of the
frontal cortex [22]. This may imply that indeed the ability to
inhibit the own perspective and general inhibitory control rely
upon a similar cortical mechanism.
Building upon the above, Samson et al. [38] proposed a two-
component model for ToM comprising (1) a self-perspective
inhibition component and (2) a belief reasoning component.
Successful self-perspective inhibition was suggested to be a
prerequisite for correct reasoning about another person’s belief.
We recently followed up on Samsons findings and examined the
neural basis of this two-component model for ToM [39]. We
found that, in line with Samsons results, self-perspective inhibition
was mediated by the bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) with a
more prominent role for the left IFG [39], while belief reasoning
was mediated by the left superior temporal gyrus (STG),
temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and middle temporal gyrus
(MTG). Moreover, overlapping areas of activation between self-
perspective inhibition and simple response inhibition (using a stop-
signal task) were found in the bilateral IFG, but again more
prominently in the left IFG, suggesting a common neural
inhibitory mechanism for these processes.
In the current study we investigated whether these underlying
neural correlates in high PP individuals differ from low PP
individuals. Furthermore, we investigated whether this is specific
for self-perspective inhibition or whether these differences can also
be detected for simple motor inhibitory processes. Since the IFG
area appears to be important for self-inhibition and misattributions
have been associated with limited inhibitory control, we specifi-
cally expected to find differences in activation in the IFG.
Furthermore, we expected to find behavioral differences between
groups on both self-perspective inhibition as well as on simple
motor response inhibition.
By investigating the underlying mechanisms of ToM in PP, we
can gain insight into the development of ToM impairments in
schizophrenia spectrum disorders. To our knowledge, this is the
first study to examine the neural dynamics underlying self-
perspective inhibition in PP and, more specifically, its possible
relationship with simple inhibitory processes.
Methods
Subjects
19 healthy undergraduate students, low PP (9 female, 10 male;
mean age 21.6, SD 2.6; same sample as in van der Meer et al.
[39]) and 18 healthy undergraduate students, high PP (8 female,
10 male; mean age 19.7, SD 1.9) of the University of Groningen
participated in the study. None of the subjects reported a history of
psychiatric or neurological disease. All subjects were recruited with
the Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences, positive scale
(CAPE [40]) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI [41])
questionnaires distributed among 600 university students. Subjects
were selected from the extremes of the CAPE positive scale, based
on willingness to participate, fMRI contra-indications and a score
of at least one standard deviation above (high PP group) or below
(low PP group) the tested sample mean (mean = 1.4, SD =2).
Subjects were only included if their BDI score was not higher than
a 10pts cutoff score [41]. Table 1 shows demographic information,
BDI and CAPE scores for both groups. All subjects were native
Dutch speakers. One of the subjects was left-handed, but since no
different brain activation patterns were found, this subject was
included in the study. All subjects signed informed consent prior to
participation. One subject did not complete the behavioral session.
For one of the subjects the CAPE distress score was missing. This
study was approved by the local ethics committee (METC) and
carried out in accordance with the latest version of the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Community Assessment of Psychic Experiences (CAPE)
The CAPE questionnaire consists of 42 self-report items
measuring lifetime frequency of attenuated psychotic symptoms
(on a 4 point scale ranging from 1-never to 4-always). The CAPE
has been developed and standardized on a Dutch population, and
was previously shown to have good validity and reliability [40].
Questions can be subdivided into three factors: attenuated
psychotic symptoms, distress caused by these experiences, and
negative symptoms. Since especially positive symptoms of schizo-
phrenia are related to ToM impairments [42], the CAPE positive
symptom scale and CAPE distress scale were assessed in this study.
Procedure
All subjects performed two experimental fMRI tasks, a ToM
task and stop-signal task. The order of the tasks was counterbal-
anced to prevent order effects. The ToM task contained three
behavioral control conditions, administered outside the fMRI
scanner, and three experimental conditions, administered in the
fMRI scanner. Testing for behavioral conditions took place in a
quiet environment and lasted approximately 30 minutes for each
subject. The fMRI session lasted approximately 60 minutes for
each subject.
Table 1. Demographic information, BDI and CAPE scores for
both groups.
Low PP High PP
mean SD mean SD
proportion male .53 – .56 –
Age (years) 21.42 2.6 20.1 1.87
CAPE positive* 1.12 .04 1.8 .15
CAPE distress* 3.6 1.6 19.6 .25
BDI+ 2.42 2.4 6.56 2.67
*p,0,0001.
+controlled for CAPE distress scale.
A chi-square test was used to test for differences in sex between groups, Mann-
whitney U tests were performed for age and CAPE scores. Differences in BDI
scores were tested with an ANOVA and controlled for the CAPE distress scale.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067774.t001
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Experimental tasks
Theory of Mind task. The ToM task consisted of short
movie clips (21 sec) and was adapted from Samson et al. [38,43]
and Apperly et al. [29]. The movie clips featured a male and a
female actor, a green object and two boxes. The female actor
placed a pink note on one of the boxes as a clue for the location of
the green object either before or after leaving the room. In her
absence the man changed the location of the boxes, resulting in a
false belief for the woman upon her return. At the end of the
movie clip subjects were required to answer a question either
about the belief of the woman or about the location of the object.
A detailed description of the task can be found in van der Meer
et al. [39].
The task contained six conditions. The first three conditions
were administered in the MRI scanner (see Figure 1 for a
schematic representation); (1) High-Inhibition (HI) requiring
inhibition of the subjects’ own perspective as well as belief
reasoning, (2) Low-Inhibition (LI), requiring only belief reasoning
and no self-perspective inhibition, (3) Baseline Control (BC)
requiring neither belief reasoning, nor self-perspective inhibition.
Though we tried to stay as close as possible to the original
movieclips of Samson et al. [38], the movieclips did require slight
modification to be able to assess in the MRI scanner (see van der
Meer et al. [39] for details about these modifications). For the BC
condition we used the clue confirmation videos (see Figure 1)
described by Apperly et al. [29].
Besides experimental fMRI conditions, we included three
control conditions; (4) Disengage Control, ensuring successful
disengagement from one box and subsequent switching of
attention to the other box. This is to make sure that incorrect
answers on conditions 1–2 are not due to an inability to disengage
attention from the incorrect box (DC), (5) Working Memory
control, ensuring proper working memory function to make sure
incorrect answers on conditions 1–3 are not due to working
memory failure (WM) and (6) Strategy Control (SC), controlling
for response strategies without full understanding of the task (e.g.
always pointing to a different box than the woman). A thorough
description of the conditions 4–6 (identical to the conditions
inhibition control, working memory control and true belief, respectively) can
be found in Apperly et al. [29].
Conditions 1–3 were administered in the fMRI scanner,
conditions 4–6 in a behavioral session. Conditions in the fMRI
session entailed 24 movie clips, 12 with the hint on the left box and
12 on the right box. Besides the left/right difference, movieclips
within conditions were identical. Six filler items, where questions
for HI and LI conditions were switched, were added to make sure
the upcoming questions were unpredictable to the subjects. This
resulted in a total of 90 trials, administered in five sessions of 18
pseudo randomized trials, to ensure an identical number of trials
of each condition per session. In the behavioral session, three
blocks of 16 randomized trials were administered, resulting in a
total of 48 trials (16 per condition). None of the behavioral
conditions required belief reasoning.
Stop-signal task. This task was modeled after Rubia et al.
[44] and was identical to the task used in our previous study [39].
Subjects were presented with arrows pointing left or right (equally
balanced; duration 500 ms) and had to press a key corresponding
to the direction of the arrow (go-condition). In the stop-condition,
an arrow pointing upward was presented beside the arrow
pointing left or right and appeared either just after or simulta-
neously with the first arrow upon which subjects should hold back
their response. The task was programmed so that a maximum of
50% correct would be achieved for the stop trials. See van der
Meer et al. [39] for a more detailed description of the task.
Scanning technique
Subjects were positioned in a 3.0 Tesla whole-body scanner
(Philips Intera, Best, NL). The head was kept in position by foam
cushions on each side of the head and an elastic band around the
head. Stimuli were projected by a beamer onto a screen visible to
the subject via a mirror. Responses were given by using the two
most outward buttons of a four-button button box to indicate left
or right box/arrow.
Scanning Parameters
Functional images were acquired using a sense-8 head coil.
1309 functional volumes for the ToM paradigm and 280 for the
stop-signal paradigm were acquired by T2*-weighted echo planar
images consisting of 37 3.5 mm thick axial slices with a 0 mm gap
(EPI, TR =2.00 s, TE = 35 ms, flip angle = 70u, FOV
=224 mm, 64664 matrix of 3.563.563.5 voxels). Slices were
acquired interleaved and oriented parallel to the AC–PC plane. A
T1-weighted 3D fast-field echo (FFE) anatomical image parallel to
the bicommissural plane was acquired covering the whole brain
(160 slices; TR =25 ms; TE = 4.6 ms; slice-thickness = 1 mm;
2566256 matrix; FOV 26 cm; voxel size, 16161 mm).
fMRI Statistical analyses
FMRI data were converted with MRI-cro (from Philips PAR to
Analyze) and analysed using Statistical Parametric Mapping
(SPM5), run in MATLAB 7 (The MathWorks Inc., Natick, MA,
USA). All functional images were slicetime corrected, realigned,
coregistrated with the anatomical T1 image, spatially normalized
to standard stereotactic space (MNI T1 template) and spatially
smoothed with a 3D isotropic Gaussian kernel (FWHM 10 mm). A
high-pass filter of 1.1 times the longest period between two
subsequent trials of the same condition was used to filter out
systematic low-frequency activation unrelated to the task. For both
tasks, only correctly answered items were used in the analyses.
Contrasts for the ToM task were made for the question-response
period, since the assignment became clear at this moment (during
the movieclips, the upcoming question was still unpredictable). To
minimize the amount of noise in the signal, a fixed duration of two
seconds was used for all ToM trials, since the vast majority of the
response times was below two seconds.
For analysis at group level, two-sample T-tests were performed
for two contrasts of interest: (1) HI . LI for self-perspective
inhibition and (2) ((HI + LI ) . fixation) for belief reasoning. This
last contrast was specifically chosen for belief reasoning since our
previous work indicated that the BC condition was not a reliable
baseline condition due to possible implicit perspective taking
processes [39]. A region of interest (ROI) analysis for the IFG was
performed for the HI.LI condition, since group differences were
expected in this contrast and this region specifically. The ROI was
based upon previously published neuroimaging studies on ToM
(see File S1 for a detailed description). For the stop-signal task a
two sample T-test with the contrast of interest (stop . go) and the
same ROI was used to investigate whether differences in activation
would be observed in the same areas in simple inhibitory processes
as compared to the more complex self-inhibition. Reported
activations for (HI . LI) and (stop . go) were FDR corrected
(p,.05). All comparisons versus fixation were FWE corrected
(p,.05). The minimally activated number of voxels for all
contrasts was set to 20.
Self-Inhibition in Psychosis Proneness
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Results
Behavioral data
Theory of Mind task. Behavioral data for the self-inhibition
task are presented in Table 2. Repeated measures analyses were
performed for the behavioral session for accuracy and for reaction
times (RT) with condition (DC, SC & WM) as within subjects factor
and group (low vs high PP) as between subjects factor. For accuracy
no significant effects for condition, group or condition x group
interaction were demonstrated (p..05), which indicates a similar
performance for both groups and for all conditions. For RT a
significant main effect for condition (F (2, 33) = 42.7, p,.0001)
was found. Pairwise comparisons revealed that RT’s for the WM
condition were significantly higher than for the DC and the SC
condition (p,.0001), but that RT’s for DC and SC did not
significantly differ (p..05). No significant main effect for group,
nor an interaction effect between group and condition was found.
Thus, differences in RT’s were observed between conditions, but
this effect was similar for both groups.
Secondly, repeated measures analyses were performed for the
fMRI conditions for accuracy and for RT’s with condition (HI, LI &
CC) as within subjects factor and group (low vs high PP) as
between subjects factor. This did not reveal any significant effects
for condition, group or condition x group interaction with respect
to accuracy (p..05). For RT a significant main effect for condition
(F (2, 34) = 99.6, p,.0001) was found, which indicates that RT’s
differed between conditions. Pairwise comparisons revealed that
RT’s for HI were significantly higher than for BC and LI
(p,.0001), and RT’s for BC were significantly higher than for LI
(p,.0001). No main effect for group, nor a condition x group
interaction was observed for RT’s. This indicates that even though
a difference in RT’s was observed between conditions, this effect
was similar for both groups.
Stop-signal task
Analyses of the behavioral results of the stop-signal task (see
Table 2) confirmed the percentage correct mentioned in the
method section (mean low PP =50%; mean high PP = 51%),
indicating that the algorithm worked properly. A MANOVA with
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the Theory of Mind task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067774.g001
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go reaction time (RT) and go accuracy as dependent variables and
group (low vs high PP) as an independent variable did not reveal
any group differences (p..05).
Imaging results
The main effect of the ToM task in low PP only revealed
activation in the bilateral IFG for self-inhibition and activation in
the STG and TPJ activation for belief reasoning. In addition,
simple response inhibition revealed overlapping activation with
self-inhibition in the bilateral IFG (see also van der Meer et al.
[39]).
Theory of Mind
Figure 2 depicts activation patterns for the HI . LI contrast in
both groups as well as the difference in activation between groups.
Table 3 lists all significant peak activations. As hypothesized, we
found significantly more activation in the left IFG for high PP in
the HI . LI contrast. An additional whole brain analysis to detect
any unexpected differential activation patterns did not reveal any
other areas of differential activation in the HI . LI contrast for
either low vs high PP subjects or vice versa.
The belief reasoning conditions (HI . Fixation and LI .
Fixation) revealed left STG, TPJ, MTG, supramarginal gyrus,
superior parietal lobe, insula, dMPFC and precuneus activation
(see File S2). No group differences were observed for this contrast.
Thus, both groups demonstrated similar areas of activation.
Stop-signal. The contrast stop . go yielded activation in the
bilateral IFG as well as insula, bilateral MTG and post central
gyrus. Both groups demonstrated a similar activation pattern (see
File S3). No group difference in activation was observed in the
region of interest analysis in the IFG. An additional whole brain
analysis to detect any unexpected differential activation patterns
did not reveal any areas of differential activation between groups.
Discussion
As hypothesized, the data revealed more activation in the left
IFG for high compared to low PP individuals on ToM during self-
perspective inhibition, despite equal behavioral performance. This
suggests that in order to perform as well as low PP on self-
inhibition, recruitment of neural resources is higher in high PP
subjects. The low and high PP groups performed equally well on
the control ToM conditions, suggesting that differences in the
fMRI conditions cannot be due to either problems in working
memory, disengagement or response strategies unrelated to the
task. No behavioral or functional differences between groups were
found in the belief reasoning condition, suggesting that high PP
subjects were equally able to reason about others’ belief, when no
self-perspective inhibition was required. Furthermore, the lack of
difference in activation and behavioral performance between
groups in the stop signal task suggests that the increased effort in
the self-inhibition condition cannot be ascribed to deficits in basic
inhibitory processes.
Literature has been equivocal with regard to the performance of
high PP on ToM, reporting differences as well as similarities in
behavioral performance. A study by Versmissen et al. [7] suggests
that the more vulnerable one is for the development of a psychotic
disorder, the worse the performance on ToM. Despite the
apparent simplicity of our task (the percentage correct for both
groups was higher than 97% in all conditions, suggesting a ceiling
effect) and equal behavioral performance, high PP subjects showed
higher activation of the left IFG during self-inhibition. This finding
is especially interesting since it suggests that even though the task
was relatively simple for all subjects (all university students), high
PP required more resources to reach the same performance in the
inhibition of the self-perspective. Interestingly, a study by
Kobayashi et al. [45] found increased activation in the left IFG
in children relative to adults on a cartoon perspective taking task,
despite similar behavioral performance. The authors ascribed the
increased activation in the left IFG to a more effortful process.
Furthermore, Rapp et al. [46] demonstrated a positive correlation
between psychometric schizotypy and activation in the left IFG in
an irony comprehesion task, but did not find any behavioral
differences between high and low schizotypy. Similarly, Modinos
et al. [47] investigated cognitive and emotional ToM using
schematic cartoons in high PP individuals. Despite equal
behavioral performance, they found increased activation in the
left IFG, dorsomedial and anterior prefrontal cortex for high PP in
Table 2. Behavioral results ToM and stop-signal task for both groups.
Healthy Controls Psychosis Prone
Mean RT (sec) SD (sec) accuracy (%) Mean RT (sec) SD (sec) accuracy (%)
ToM task
fmri conditions
HI 1.34 .28 97.6 1.34 .20 96.8
LI .93 .25 97.1 .92 .20 97.5
BC 1.17 .34 99.1 1.22 .20 98.0
behavioral conditions
DC 1.00 .38 99.3 1.00 .30 98.5
SC .97 .37 97.2 1.03 .26 97.0
WM 1.30 .39 98.3 1.29 .36 97.8
Stop-signal task
go .49 .10 97 .45 .73 97
stop – – 50 – – 51
go after correct stop .48 .98 100 .44 .73 97
go after incorrect stop .50 .10 97 .46 .64 95
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067774.t003
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second order ToM but not in first order ToM. Thus, when
subjects had to make more complex inferences such as imagining
the inference of the other person about yet another person, high
PP individuals seemed to need more resources than low PP
subjects. When another person’s mental state differs from one’s
own, the self-model may no longer be correct and may require
inhibition. Importantly, the design of Modinos et al. [47] did not
allow for the separate investigation of self-perspective inhibition.
Moreover, the task design of the current study was more similar to
real life situations, since they were movieclips of human actors
instead of the more abstract cartoons that were used in Modinos
et al. [47].
Interestingly, Lee et al. [48] administered a task in schizophre-
nia patients that beared similarity with the task used in the current
study. They distinguished four cartoon conditions including an
inhibitory empathy condition, requiring the observer to inhibit the
perspective of one of the characters. Thus, this inhibitory empathy
condition is comparable to our self-inhibition condition. They
found more activation in the right IFG in schizophrenia patients in
the inhibitory condition. Even though we found a group difference
in left IFG activation, the bilateral IFG was demonstrated to be
important for self-perspective inhibition [39]. This seems to
suggest that more effort is needed in schizophrenia patients as well
as in high PP individuals for the inhibitory component of ToM. In
a recent study, Bailey and Henry [49] used exactly the same
paradigm as the current study in schizophrenia patients, but did
not measure brain activation. Their results showed a trend
towards a larger impairment in the HI condition than in the LI
condition for schizophrenia patients. Additionally, Jeong et al.
[50] found abnormalities in functional as well as anatomical
connectivity between the IFG and the superior temporal gyrus,
which also has been related to ToM processing [3]. Thus,
converging results suggest that one of the core features that may be
hampered in schizophrenia as well as in subjects with a
predisposition to develop a psychotic disorder, is the inhibition
of the own perspective.
An important question is whether such processes are dependent
upon more basic inhibitory processes. Even though we found that
Figure 2. High Inhibition (HI) versus Low Inhibition (LI). Activation patterns for high PP depicted in yellow and for low PP depicted in green.
Differential activation pattern between groups depicted in red. TOP: left hemisphere at x-coordinates (MNI-space) 250, 246, 242, 234 (from left to
right). MIDDLE: right hemisphere at x-coordinates (MNI-space) 50, 46, 42, 34 (from left to right). BOTTOM: PP . HC, slices represent x-coordinates
(MNI-space) 250, 246, 242 (from left to right).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067774.g002
Table 3. Peak activations for PP. HC for the ToM contrast HI





(voxels x y z T-value
Left IFG 297 244 14 10 3.88
244 20 14 3.84
246 8 12 3.78
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067774.t002
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high PP subjects may need to put in more effort during self-
perspective inhibition, such extra inhibitory effort was not found in
the simple response inhibition task. This may be due to the lack of
contextual cues in our task. Steel et al. [51] demonstrated in a
paradigm with richer contextual cues than our paradigm that
subjects with positive schizotypy performed worse on a response
inhibition task. Such an interpretation is supported by the findings
of Barbalat et al. [52], who demonstrated that schizophrenia
patients show decreased activation in the bilateral IFG as
compared to healthy controls when extra contextual information
had to be processed, while no group differences were found for the
processing of episodic information. We suggest that in self-
perspective inhibition the amount of contextual cues is higher than
in simple response inhibition and thus has a higher inhibitory task
load. The number of contextual cues in daily life will exceed that
of laboratory settings, thus more problems should be expected due
to impaired self-perspective inhibition. This reasoning is supported
by experiments relating a higher inhibitory task load to decreased
performance on ToM tasks in young children [53].
Some limitations with regard to the design of the study should
be mentioned. Firstly, both low and high PP groups were selected
out of a student population. Thus, all subjects, low and high PP,
had a baseline cognitive capacity that may be better than the
general population. Selecting high and low PP subjects from the
general population may result in more pronounced differences
between groups. Furthermore, the design of the current task did
not enable us to analyse the activation during the movieclips.
Thus, specific processes could not be assessed for the movieclips,
but only for the question response period following the movieclips.
Finally, the high performance in both groups in terms of accuracy
seems to suggest a ceiling effect. Despite this ceiling effect, we
found differences in neural activation. This suggest that should we
adopt a more complicated paradigm in future research, we may be
able to draw firmer conclusions regarding the behavioral and
neural performance on ToM of high PP subjects.
In sum, our study suggests that high PP individuals put in more
effort when inhibiting the self-perspective. The combined results of
self-inhibition and simple motor response inhibition, suggest that
this increased effort may lie in the processing of increased
contextual cues. Though high PP subjects seem to be able to
address a compensatory mechanism for self-inhibition, individuals
with more severe psychiatric conditions, such as schizophrenia or
autism, may no longer be able to compensate. This may account
for their ToM impairments and social disfunctioning.
These results are of relevance, since they suggest that it might
not be perspective taking per se in which high PP individuals and
schizophrenia patients differ from low PP subject or healthy
control subjects, but rather difficulties in the inhibition of one’s
own perspective. Garety et al. [54] suggested that impaired
cognitive and emotional functioning can induce a transition to
psychosis for subjects with a vulnerability for psychosis. Thus,
investigating the relationship between social functioning, ToM
processing, more specifically self-inhibition, and simple inhibitory
processing in schizophrenia patients may provide new insight into
factors that are predictive of the transition to psychosis in PP
individuals.
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